OTTAWA — More than three years after the United States began removing surveillance equipment manufactured in China from sensitive sites, the Department of National Defence appears not to have checked where cameras and other gear on its bases were made.

In early 2020, after the United States banned multiple models of security camera manufactured in China from federal use, the Department of National Defence told The Logic it wouldn’t follow suit—in part, the department said at the time, because it had 20,000 buildings, didn’t manage those properties centrally, and didn’t have an inventory of where their security gear came from.

Now that the United Kingdom and Australia have said they share American concerns that devices from Chinese manufacturers could endanger their national security, The Logic asked whether National Defence has compiled the inventory of cameras and related gear that it lacked three years ago.

A statement sent by spokesperson Dan Le Bouthillier did not answer that question.

“The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces take physical and corporate security extremely seriously and ensures it has a robust and effective security program in place,” it said.

“This is accomplished through the development and maintenance of a comprehensive security policy, tailored to both DND/CAF departmental and operational requirements through which we continually assess the effectiveness of our security practices.”

All closed-circuit video equipment comes through a list of vendors maintained by the government’s procurement department, Le Bouthillier wrote. Those vendors generally install and maintain equipment that they buy from manufacturers and resell.

“Acquisitions are done in accordance with DND/CAF industrial security program protocols, which provides oversight of the risks associated with supply chain integrity commensurate with the intended final use of goods/services,” Le Bouthillier wrote.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has warned that China’s National Intelligence Law, which gives its government authority to compel Chinese companies to cooperate with intelligence-gathering, makes its technology companies potential threats.

“Both the human and technical reach of Chinese companies now give the intelligence services opportunities to gain direct access to many governments within the developing world as well as many Allied and European countries with inroads into other societies,” the agency reported in 2018.

Since then, the Liberal government has proposed a cybersecurity law, Bill C-26, that would let it order private telecom networks to rip out gear from China-based Huawei and ZTE. If Canadian communication passes through their equipment, the government asserted, the companies could be “compelled to comply with extrajudicial directions from foreign governments in ways that would conflict with Canadian laws or would be detrimental to Canadian interests.”

The Canadian government has also decided not to buy X-ray security scanners for embassies from a Chinese manufacturer.

Since the U.S. began pushing Chinese-made cameras out of its public security systems in 2019—specifically targeting products from radio company Hytera and camera companies Hikvision and Dahua—several other Canadian allies in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network have tightened restrictions on cameras and similar surveillance equipment from China.

In November 2022, the U.K. ordered government agencies to not install new Chinese cameras at sensitive sites, to disconnect Chinese-made surveillance equipment from core networks and to consider removing it altogether.

Also in November, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission restricted the sale of security equipment from several Chinese brands even to consumers.

In February, a British government surveillance watchdog reported that many police departments use cameras from Chinese manufacturers, and pointed out that software updates can create new backdoors in equipment after it’s been installed.

That same month, Australia’s defence minister said the country would remove Chinese-made cameras from government buildings.

New Zealand, the fifth of the Five Eyes countries, has not followed suit. Its defence minister Andrew Little said in February, following Australia’s announcement, that he didn’t think Chinese surveillance technology was likely to be found in New Zealand government buildings. This month, a news investigation found that Little was wrong, and the parliamentary opposition is calling for an audit to find out how extensively the devices are deployed.

Tracking the origins of completed products, let alone the components within, is not always easy. In 2019, U.S. authorities charged a New York security company with passing off Chinese products “with known cybersecurity vulnerabilities” as American-made, and selling them to the U.S. government and military.

A 2021 investigation by U.S. outlet The Intercept found multiple military branches using cameras from Chinese manufacturers (or with components from them) but sold under other brands.